Ramon Llull — *Liber de ascensu et descensu intellectus*: The Book of the Ascent and Descent of the Intellect and the Ladder of Being

 

R v Garcia

R v Garcia










# Ramon Llull — *Liber de ascensu et descensu intellectus*: The Book of the Ascent and Descent of the Intellect and the Ladder of Being


**Author:** Ramon Llull (c. 1232–1316)

**Original title:** *Liber de ascensu et descensu intellectus*

**English title:** *The Book of the Ascent and Descent of the Intellect*

**Composed:** Montpellier, March 1305, according to the chronological catalog of Llull’s works.

**First known printed edition:** Valencia, 1512, printed by Jorge Costilla.

**Fields of inquiry:** Medieval philosophy, epistemology, metaphysics, logic, theology, the hierarchy of beings, and the philosophy of knowledge.


## Introduction — The Ladder of Knowledge: From Matter to Intellect and from Intellect to an Understanding of Reality


Some books attempt to explain the world through its material components. Others seek to understand it through mathematics, the observation of nature, historical investigation, or reflection on consciousness. Yet some works begin with an even broader question: How can the human intellect move from what it perceives through the senses toward an understanding of a reality that extends beyond immediate experience?


At the beginning of the fourteenth century, Ramon Llull, the Majorcan philosopher, theologian, writer, and religious thinker, developed a particularly significant approach to this problem. In *Liber de ascensu et descensu intellectus*, Llull presents a way of organizing knowledge in which the intellect can move through different levels of reality. It begins with sensible things and ascends toward intelligible truths, but it can also travel in the opposite direction, returning from higher principles to a more detailed understanding of particular things.


The image that best summarizes this proposal is a ladder. Its rungs represent different degrees of being and different possibilities for knowledge. Material reality provides the starting point of inquiry; living organisms introduce additional capacities; sensory perception expands an organism’s relationship with its environment; human reason makes it possible to reflect on what is perceived; and, within Llull’s theological framework, the inquiry continues toward spiritual realities and God.


The ladder should not be understood merely as a picture of superiority and inferiority. Above all, it represents an intellectual structure through which the medieval thinker sought to establish relationships among different domains of existence. The world is not simply a collection of unrelated objects. It is an ordered reality whose elements can be compared and understood through their differences, similarities, relationships, and purposes.


The most important feature of this framework is the two-way movement of knowledge. To ascend is to begin with concrete experience and seek a more comprehensive understanding. To descend is to return from general principles to particular things, interpreting them within a broader structure of relationships. The intellect should not remain indefinitely on a single rung. Its movement makes it possible to connect sensory experience, reasoning, and metaphysical interpretation.


This proposal must be understood within its historical context. Llull did not formulate a modern scientific theory of evolution, neuroscience, or artificial intelligence. Nor did he write a contemporary critique of industrial animal agriculture or the creation of subordinate beings. His thought belongs to medieval Christian philosophy and is deeply connected to his understanding of God, creation, and the possibility of rationally demonstrating religious truths.


That historical distinction does not prevent contemporary readers from examining his work from new perspectives. A philosophical idea can retain its historical identity while offering a starting point for questions its original author never asked. Llull’s ladder can, for example, help us explore the relationship between knowledge and power, the limits of reason, the responsibilities that accompany intellectual ability, and the danger of confusing technical superiority with moral superiority.


To pursue this inquiry rigorously, we must distinguish three dimensions. The first consists of ideas that can historically be attributed to Ramon Llull. The second involves philosophical interpretations of his concepts. The third includes contemporary reflections inspired by his work. Keeping these dimensions separate prevents a modern interpretation from being mistaken for a literal statement by the medieval author.


The purpose of this study is to offer an extensive examination of *Liber de ascensu et descensu intellectus*, placing it in historical context, explaining the logic of ascent and descent, examining its hierarchy of beings, and exploring the philosophical implications of this model. Rather than reproducing a medieval image in isolation, we will investigate the system of thought behind it and ask what it means to understand a reality that presents itself at multiple levels.


Llull’s ladder begins with the world we can perceive. But the fundamental questions are how far the intellect can climb, what it can understand at each stage, and how it should use that knowledge when it returns to concrete reality.


## 1. Ramon Llull: The Thinker Who Sought to Organize Universal Knowledge


Ramon Llull was born in Majorca around 1232, in a society shaped by the coexistence and conflict of different religious traditions, especially Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. The island was part of the territories associated with the Crown of Aragon and served as a setting for the movement of people, languages, ideas, and competing political interests.


Although Llull is sometimes described generically as a Spanish philosopher, a more historically precise description identifies him as a Majorcan thinker working within the medieval Catalan intellectual tradition and the political world of the Crown of Aragon.


His intellectual journey did not follow the usual path of a university scholastic philosopher. Traditional biographical accounts describe a man whose early life was connected with the court and literary culture, but who underwent a religious transformation and devoted much of the remainder of his life to philosophical inquiry, writing, and Christian missionary activity.


The account of his conversion is known principally through *Vita coaetanea*, a biographical text composed in 1311. According to that account, religious experiences led Llull to abandon his earlier ambitions and dedicate himself to an intellectual and missionary project.


The extraordinary episodes recounted in this biography belong to the historical tradition surrounding Llull’s life and should not automatically be treated as events independently confirmed by multiple sources. What is firmly documented is his extensive literary activity and the development of a distinctive philosophical system.


Llull wrote more than two hundred works during his lifetime, primarily in Catalan and Latin, while also pursuing a project that engaged with the Arabic-speaking world and the Arabic language. His writings cover philosophy, theology, logic, literature, mysticism, education, and religious and political questions.


A central element unites a significant portion of this output: the *Ars*, or Lullian Art. Here, *art* does not mean artistic expression in the modern sense. It refers to a method of inquiry that seeks to combine fundamental principles, concepts, relationships, and argumentative procedures in order to discover and demonstrate truths.


Llull believed that a well-organized rational framework could be applied to different areas of knowledge. Rather than treating every problem as though it required a completely separate method, he sought to develop a general instrument of investigation.


This ambition helps explain the importance of *Liber de ascensu et descensu intellectus*. The work should not be separated from the broader context of his philosophy, because the ladder of knowledge is connected to his conviction that creation possesses an intelligible order and that the human intellect can investigate it.


In this view, reality is not understood merely by accumulating information. Knowledge requires discovering relationships, comparing properties, making distinctions, and understanding how different levels of existence are connected.


This also explains the importance of images, diagrams, and structured representations in Llull’s work. Visual representation is not merely decorative. It can make a conceptual order visible that might otherwise seem too abstract.


Lullian thought therefore combines the spirituality of medieval Christianity, an ambitious approach to logic, and a systematic organization of knowledge. Its originality lies less in the isolated invention of every individual element than in the way Llull brings them together within a comprehensive intellectual project.


The ladder should be interpreted in this context: not as an independent drawing, but as a representation of an ordered reality and of an intellect capable of investigating its relationships.


## 2. The Origins and Significance of *Liber de ascensu et descensu intellectus*


The Latin title *Liber de ascensu et descensu intellectus* can be translated into English as *The Book of the Ascent and Descent of the Intellect*. The title captures the central question of the work: the intellect’s capacity to move upward and downward through different levels of knowledge.


The Latin word *liber* means book. *Ascensus* refers to ascent or upward movement. *Descensus* means descent or downward movement. *Intellectus* refers to the intellect—the capacity to understand, grasp, and reason about things.


The title therefore describes more than a physical ladder. It announces an inquiry into the movements of intelligence itself.


The chronological catalog of Ramon Llull’s works, based on the scholarship of Anthony Bonner, dates the composition of *Liber de ascensu et descensu intellectus* to March 1305 in Montpellier. This is more precise than saying simply that the work was written “around 1305.” The date is recorded in scholarly bibliographic resources. citeturn201701search1turn201701search3


The work’s publication history also deserves attention. It was printed in Valencia in 1512 by Jorge Costilla, more than two centuries after its composition. The historical edition appeared alongside other Lullian writings concerned with logic, correlatives, and the ascent and descent of the intellect.


The distinction between composition and printing matters. The existence of a printed edition from 1512 does not mean the work was written that year. The text belonged to an earlier manuscript tradition, while the printed edition represents a later stage in the transmission of Llull’s thought.


A modern critical edition of the Latin text appeared in *Raimundi Lulli Opera Latina*, volume IX, within the series *Corpus Christianorum, Continuatio Mediaevalis*, volume 35, in 1981. This edition is an important scholarly reference for researchers examining the Latin text and its intellectual context. citeturn201701search0turn201701search3


The work’s significance is connected to its attempt to organize understanding through a sequence of levels. The intellect does not merely receive information passively through the senses. It can begin with that information, establish comparisons, and seek a broader understanding.


The reverse movement is equally important. General ideas must return to the realm of particular things if they are to help us understand the world in a more integrated way. An inquiry that only accumulates perceptions remains limited; an inquiry that abandons experience and loses itself in abstraction risks losing contact with the very reality it seeks to explain.


The structure of ascent and descent thus offers a model for movement between experience and intelligibility.


A methodological qualification is necessary. This article presents an interpretive synthesis of the work, informed by scholarship on Lullian philosophy and the critical bibliographic tradition. It is not a complete translation of the treatise or a verbatim reproduction of every chapter. Explanatory examples and contemporary applications should be understood as tools of analysis, not as direct quotations from Llull.


This distinction is especially important because the familiar image of the ladder can be simplified until it loses the philosophical precision of the original system. The ladder is not merely a sequence of familiar figures—stone, fire, plant, animal, human being, heaven, angel, and God. It represents an epistemological and metaphysical structure whose interpretation requires attention to the concepts associated with each level and the relationships between them.


## 3. The Ladder of Beings: An Ordered Representation of Reality


The concept known as the *scala naturae*, or the “Great Chain of Being,” was widespread in different philosophical and theological traditions of antiquity and the Middle Ages. It expressed the idea that reality could be organized according to distinct degrees of existence, capacities, and perfection.


Llull worked within this intellectual tradition but integrated it into his own understanding of knowledge and the relationships among beings.


In the best-known simplified presentation, the ladder begins with the material elements and proceeds through plants, animals, and human beings toward the celestial spheres, angels, and God. This image is useful as an introduction, but it needs refinement if we are to avoid reducing Llull’s structure to a merely illustrative sequence.


Studies of Llull identify levels such as the *elementative*, *vegetative*, *sensitive*, *imaginative*, *human*, *celestial*, *angelic*, and *divine*. The Lullian tradition also includes instrumentality or artifice, associated with things produced through human capacities and placed below the elementative level in certain formulations of the ladder.


These categories belong to medieval cosmology and metaphysics. They are not equivalent to a modern scientific classification of materials, species, or natural systems. Their purpose is to organize levels of being according to the capacities and properties recognized within the philosophy of the period. The *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* provides a useful scholarly overview of this hierarchy and its place in Llull’s metaphysics. citeturn201701search0


The ladder should be understood as a conceptual map. A map is not reality itself: it selects characteristics, establishes relationships, and organizes what it is intended to represent. Its value depends on how effectively it makes otherwise scattered relationships intelligible.


In Llull’s framework, each level makes certain characteristics recognizable while allowing comparisons with other levels. What distinguishes a plant from a stone, for example, is not merely appearance but the set of capacities attributed to each kind of being. Plant life involves nutrition, growth, and reproduction—properties not attributed to a stone in the same way.


The difference between an animal and a plant includes sensory perception and other capacities associated with animal life. In Llull’s philosophical framework, the distinction between animals and human beings involves reason and the ability to pursue intellectual inquiry.


This structure does not mean that each level is completely isolated from the others. On the contrary, knowledge of reality depends on the possibility of identifying both differences and similarities among them.


A stone, a plant, an animal, and a human being are not interchangeable, but they can be compared. The intellect investigates what distinguishes them and what allows them to be situated within a more comprehensive order.


The metaphysical dimension of the ladder emerges when this organization is interpreted as an order of creation. For Llull, God is the supreme principle, and other beings do not exist in a state of absolute independence. The intelligibility of creation is connected to its origin and its dependence on the Creator.


This premise is essential to an accurate interpretation of the author. The ladder is not a secular theory of increasing complexity, nor is it an early version of evolutionary biology. It is a philosophical and theological organization of reality in which the different degrees of being belong to an order that culminates in God.


A contemporary reader may compare this structure with other hierarchical models, but should not confuse them. Modern scientific classifications rely on methods, evidence, and concepts that were unavailable to Llull. A visual resemblance between a medieval hierarchy and a modern diagram does not establish theoretical identity.


Nevertheless, the ladder remains intellectually interesting because it raises a lasting question: How can we relate very different entities within a coherent understanding of the world?


That question continues to appear in fields as diverse as biology, philosophy of mind, systems theory, and epistemology. The methods and answers have changed, but the ambition to understand relationships across different levels of reality remains one of the enduring tasks of human thought.


## 4. The Elementative Level: Matter, Elements, and the Limits of Analogy


At the base of the Lullian ladder lies the elementative domain, associated with medieval conceptions of the elements and the fundamental properties of material reality.


Medieval thought inherited and transformed ancient ideas about elements, qualities, and natural processes. Within Llull’s intellectual world, nature was understood through an order of properties and relationships that made it possible to interpret bodies and their transformations.


The image of a stone offers an accessible illustration of a domain that does not exhibit the characteristic capacities of living things. A flame, in turn, can illustrate activity and transformation associated with physical processes. We should not, however, assume that the familiar sequence “stone, flame, plant” is a literal and exhaustive transcription of every rung in the original work.


The essential point is the philosophical function of this level: it establishes the material starting point from which the intellect begins its inquiry.


The sensible world is not irrelevant or unworthy of attention. It is the domain in which we encounter the differences that reason seeks to understand. Matter presents observable properties, behaviors, and relationships that can be investigated.


When we observe a stone, we can identify its weight, shape, texture, composition, and resistance. When we examine a flame, we encounter transformation, heat, and interaction with the surrounding environment. Modern scientific descriptions of these phenomena differ substantially from medieval explanations, but both examples illustrate the importance of distinguishing initial perception from conceptual interpretation.


A person may see a stone without understanding its mineral composition. Someone may observe a flame without knowing the chemical reactions involved in combustion. Experience supplies information; inquiry seeks explanations.


In its epistemological dimension, the Lullian ladder can be understood as a representation of the possibility of moving from observation toward understanding.


This does not mean Llull developed the experimental method of modern science. Such a claim would be historically inaccurate. His project was embedded in a metaphysical and theological framework in which reasoning, analogy, and the interpretation of the principles of creation played central roles.


The distinction between medieval thought and contemporary science does not eliminate the value of comparison. It helps us understand how different periods developed different answers to the enduring human need to organize experience.


The important point is not to claim that Llull anticipated all of modern science, but to recognize that he sought to construct a framework in which particular phenomena could be related to a broader order.


## 5. The Vegetative Level: Life as a Capacity for Transformation


The vegetative level introduces a fundamental difference from inanimate matter: life.


In medieval thought, plants are characterized by capacities such as nutrition, growth, and reproduction. These properties distinguish living organisms from entities that do not exhibit the same functions.


A plant is not merely organized matter. It grows, takes in resources from its environment, develops structures, and participates in processes of reproduction. Within the hierarchy of beings, these capacities justify a position different from that occupied by inanimate things.


This example helps clarify the logic of the Lullian classification. Each rung represents a set of properties that expands or changes the way a being exists and relates to the world.


The word “higher,” however, requires care. In medieval cosmology, a higher position refers to a metaphysical hierarchy of capacities and perfections. It does not automatically mean that, in every circumstance, a being at one level possesses greater moral value than a being at another.


That distinction between ontological hierarchy and moral worth will be crucial to contemporary reflections inspired by the work.


Modern biology investigates life through concepts and evidence that were not part of Llull’s original framework. Today we can study metabolism, genetics, ecology, cellular reproduction, and evolution by natural selection. These forms of knowledge should not be attributed to the medieval author.


We can, however, observe that distinguishing levels of organization remains important to scientific inquiry. A cell, a plant, an animal, and an ecosystem exhibit different properties, and understanding each requires attention to both its distinctive characteristics and its relationships with other levels.


The analogy does not make these systems identical. It illustrates that organizing knowledge depends on identifying relevant properties.


In this sense, the plant offers an example of how inquiry moves from a simple description toward an analysis of the functions and relationships that characterize a particular domain of reality.


## 6. The Sensitive Level: Perception, Experience, and the Relationship with the Environment


With the sensitive level, the ladder reaches a set of capacities that profoundly changes a being’s relationship with the world.


Animals perceive stimuli and respond to their environments through sensory capacities. Perception is not the same as rational understanding, but it establishes a form of access to reality that cannot be reduced to the mere physical presence of an object.


An animal may detect food, recognize threats, respond to sounds, navigate its surroundings, and modify its behavior in response to environmental stimuli. In the medieval scheme, these capacities distinguish the sensitive domain from the exclusively vegetative one.


Llull’s distinction must be interpreted within the philosophical categories of his period, not as a neuroscientific description. Contemporary neuroscience has concepts and experimental methods for studying perception, learning, memory, and behavior. Llull did not possess that scientific framework.


The philosophical importance of the sensitive level lies in recognizing that different kinds of beings establish different relationships with reality.


A stone does not perceive the world as an animal does. A plant responds to environmental conditions, but the traditional classification does not attribute to it the same sensory capacities associated with animals. Animals, in turn, exhibit forms of perception and behavior that expand the range of relationships they can establish.


This organization raises an important question: Is perceiving the same as knowing?


In a broad sense, perception provides access to the environment. In a stricter philosophical sense, knowing may require the ability to recognize relationships, form concepts, evaluate reasons, and understand what is being perceived.


An animal may perceive an object without formulating a theory about its nature. A human being may observe the same object, classify it, compare it with others, and ask about the causes of its properties.


This does not justify the conclusion that animals are incapable of learning, memory, or complex cognition. Such a generalization would be inconsistent with contemporary scientific knowledge. The distinction here should remain limited to the conceptual framework Llull uses to organize levels of being.


The ladder offers a language for reflecting on differences in capacity. Applying it today requires that those differences be examined with evidence rather than treating a medieval classification as a definitive description of every form of intelligence.


## 7. The Imaginative Level: Inner Experience and the Formation of Representations


The imaginative level is particularly significant because it introduces a distinction between perceiving something and internally retaining or reproducing what has been perceived.


In the classification described by scholarship on Llull, the imaginative level concerns the capacity to reproduce internally, through imagination, aspects of what has been apprehended by the senses.


This capacity expands an organism’s relationship with its environment. A being need not be limited to an immediate stimulus that is physically present. It may retain representations, recognize situations, and guide its actions through previous experience.


Imagination, however, should not be confused with abstract reasoning. Mentally representing something does not necessarily mean understanding its causes, demonstrating a proposition, or formulating a universal principle.


The distinction helps illustrate a sequence of intellectual operations: perception provides information; imagination allows representations to be retained or recombined; rational intelligence can investigate relationships and formulate judgments.


This sequence is an explanatory synthesis, not an exact neuroscientific description of every cognitive process. Its purpose is to clarify the differences among capacities that medieval philosophy sought to distinguish.


The subject acquires additional dimensions when considered in light of contemporary debates about memory, consciousness, and mental representation. Today we understand that memory does not function as a perfect archive of records and that imagination can combine information in new ways. These discoveries, however, should not be confused with Llull’s original terminology.


The ladder suggests that knowledge is not reducible to the immediate reception of stimuli. Between experience and understanding are operations that allow information to be retained, organized, and related.


This leads to a question that remains relevant: At what point does a representation of something become an understanding of what that thing is?


Imagination can produce a convincing image without demonstrating that the image corresponds to reality. Memory can preserve an experience without guaranteeing that every detail is accurate. Reason can examine these representations, compare them with other information, and assess the consistency of the interpretations that emerge.


Llull’s model does not solve the problems of modern epistemology, but it highlights the importance of distinguishing different ways of accessing knowledge.


## 8. The Human Being: A Point of Mediation Between Matter and Spirit


In the Lullian ladder, the human being occupies a particularly important position. Human beings belong to the corporeal world but are also understood as rational creatures capable of orienting themselves toward intelligible and spiritual realities.


Humanity is not separate from nature. The human body belongs to the material world, depends on physical conditions, and participates in the processes of life. At the same time, within Llull’s philosophical anthropology, reason makes it possible to investigate the meaning of things and seek truths that go beyond immediate perception.


This dual condition explains the mediating position assigned to humanity. Human beings are embedded in creation and, within Llull’s framework, capable of reflecting on it. They are simultaneously part of the reality being investigated and subjects engaged in the investigation.


This condition raises an important epistemological question: How can human beings understand a world of which they themselves are a part?


Inquiry requires acknowledging that the observer is not outside every relationship with what is being observed. Our capacities, limitations, and assumptions influence the questions we ask and the way we interpret the answers.


This reflection can be compared with later debates about the position of the knowing subject. However, Llull should not be directly credited with modern theories of the observer, physical relativity, or quantum mechanics. Similar philosophical questions do not establish theoretical identity.


The central position of human beings in the ladder also does not mean that humanity is the final point of reality. Within Llull’s theological framework, human intelligence has limits and depends on an order that transcends it.


Human beings can know, but they do not know everything. They can reason, but they can also make mistakes. They can recognize relationships, but they can misinterpret what they perceive. They can construct arguments, but they must evaluate whether those arguments actually support their conclusions.


Human reason is powerful precisely because it makes it possible to move beyond immediate experience. Yet the ability to produce explanations does not mean that every explanation produced is true.


This mediating position can therefore be read as an intellectual demand: recognize both the possibilities and the limits of your own intelligence.


In a contemporary interpretation, this leads to a reflection on responsibility. The greater our capacity to understand and modify our environment, the greater the need to evaluate the consequences of our actions may become.


This ethical conclusion should not be presented as a thesis Llull explicitly formulated in the same modern terms. It is an interpretive extension of his philosophical structure, which relates different capacities to an ordered conception of existence.


The question remains open: Does greater intellectual capacity necessarily mean greater wisdom?


History demonstrates that technical knowledge and moral discernment are not synonymous. A person may understand how to perform an action without adequately evaluating its effects. A society may develop sophisticated instruments without considering who will benefit or suffer from their use.


The ladder thus offers an opportunity to distinguish the capacity to know from the quality of the choices made with that knowledge.


## 9. Heaven: Cosmic Order in the Medieval Worldview


Above the human level, the Lullian ladder includes the celestial domain. This level must be understood within medieval cosmology, which differs substantially from the universe described by contemporary astronomy.


In the cosmological framework dominant in much of medieval Latin thought, the heavens were conceived as part of an ordered cosmic structure. Celestial movements could be interpreted in relation to physical, metaphysical, and theological principles, and the universe was often understood as an ordered whole.


The heaven in Llull’s ladder should not automatically be equated with outer space as described by modern astronomy. Contemporary physics investigates celestial bodies, fields, radiation, gravitation, and cosmic structures through observations and mathematical models. Medieval heaven belonged to an intellectual framework that included Aristotelian conceptions and other philosophical traditions.


This historical distinction is essential. It would be inaccurate to claim that Llull anticipated contemporary scientific cosmology merely because he included the heavens in a hierarchy of being.


The philosophical interest of this level lies in its expansion of perspective. Thought is no longer limited to nearby objects and immediate human experience. It seeks to place particular existence within a more comprehensive order.


The idea of cosmic order also raises a question: Does reality possess an intelligible structure that the human intellect can investigate?


For Llull, the answer is connected to his conception of divine creation. The order of the universe is not an accident without meaning; it expresses a structure that can be investigated by the intellect.


Contemporary science formulates the question differently. Rather than necessarily beginning with a divine purpose, it seeks to identify regularities, construct models, and test explanations. Scientific results do not, by themselves, demonstrate medieval theological cosmology, just as an ancient cosmology cannot replace scientific evidence.


Nevertheless, the impulse to understand particular things in relation to the whole remains an important feature of human thought.


Within the ladder, the celestial level represents a movement toward a dimension that exceeds ordinary experience. It prepares the way toward the angelic realm and, ultimately, the divine principle at the summit of the hierarchy.


## 10. Angels: Spiritual Intelligence in Llull’s Metaphysics


Angels occupy a position above humanity in the hierarchy traditionally associated with Lullian thought. This position belongs to medieval Christian conceptions of spiritual beings that do not possess material bodies in the same way human beings do.


In Llull’s theology, angels are not merely symbolic characters or metaphors for psychological abilities. They belong to a religious worldview that includes different forms of existence, some material and others spiritual.


Within this framework, angelic intelligence represents a level of knowledge distinct from the kind that depends directly on human sensory experience.


The contrast is important. Human beings know through bodily capacities, experience, memory, imagination, and reason. According to traditional theology, angels belong to a spiritual order whose way of knowing is not identical to ordinary human cognition.


This distinction should not be confused with the empirically demonstrated existence of nonhuman forms of intelligence. Medieval philosophy operates with its own metaphysical and religious commitments. Contemporary research into animal intelligence, artificial intelligence, or hypothetical extraterrestrial intelligence raises different questions and relies on different standards of evidence.


Comparisons can be interesting as long as they do not become false equivalences. An angel in medieval theology, an artificial intelligence system created by human beings, and a hypothetical extraterrestrial civilization belong to different conceptual categories.


The fact that all three can be discussed under the word *intelligence* does not mean they share the same nature or that one proves the existence of the others.


The place of angels in the ladder demonstrates that, within Llull’s cosmology, reality is not exhausted by material beings. The hierarchy includes spiritual levels that the intellect seeks to understand according to the assumptions of Christian philosophy.


The upward movement reaches one of its most demanding points here: How can we think about a reality that, by definition, exceeds the ordinary forms of sensory experience?


Llull approaches this difficulty through his metaphysical framework, analogy, and rational method. For contemporary readers, the question also invites reflection on the limits of knowledge and on the difference between a proposition supported by a theological tradition and a claim confirmed by empirical investigation.


Recognizing this difference does not mean dismissing medieval philosophy. It means accurately understanding the kind of question it seeks to answer and the foundations on which its answer rests.


## 11. God: The Summit of the Ladder and the Principle of Intelligibility


At the summit of the hierarchy stands God, whom Llull understands as the supreme principle of reality and the foundation of the order of creation.


This point is essential if we are to avoid a mistaken interpretation of the work. The ladder is not simply a neutral classification of objects of increasing complexity. Its structure belongs to a Christian metaphysics in which the different degrees of existence ultimately depend on the Creator.


God is not merely the next rung in a sequence of material objects. In medieval theology, the relationship between God and creation is qualitatively different from the relationship between created beings. God is understood as the supreme principle, not as one more element belonging to the same category as finite things.


Intellectual ascent therefore does not mean that human beings can observe God in the same way they observe a stone or an animal. Llull approaches knowledge of the divine through philosophical and theological principles, using relationships, arguments, and analogies.


The human intellect seeks to understand creation and, through it, move toward knowledge of its foundation. This movement depends on the metaphysical assumptions that structure Lullian thought.


The central philosophical question concerns the relationship between particular beings and the principle that explains the existence and order of the whole.


In medieval Christian thought, this relationship could be examined through divine attributes, properties of creation, and arguments intended to establish the coherence of belief in God.


Llull developed his own methodology for organizing such arguments. His *Ars* sought to establish principles and combinations that could be used to investigate philosophical and theological questions systematically.


It is important, however, to distinguish the historical existence of this project from the universal validity of its conclusions. The fact that Llull developed an argumentative method does not mean that every demonstration he proposed is accepted by every philosophical or religious tradition.


A Christian reader may understand the ladder as an expression of an order created by God. A reader from another religious tradition may analyze its structure without accepting the same theological conclusion. A secular reader may study the work as a document in the history of ideas.


These readings are not identical, but they can coexist as different forms of inquiry, provided their assumptions are made explicit.


Llull’s historical contribution lies in his attempt to articulate a universal conception of knowledge within a coherent philosophical and religious framework. Contemporary critical analysis begins by distinguishing the argumentative structure, the metaphysical assumptions, and the conclusions that depend on them.


The ladder reaches its summit, but philosophical inquiry need not end there. Historical research can continue to examine how the model was constructed, which traditions influenced its formation, and how it was received over the centuries.


## 12. Ascent: Moving from Experience Toward a Broader Understanding


The first direction announced in the title is ascent: the upward movement of the intellect.


In general terms, the process begins with things that can initially be known through experience and seeks to develop a more comprehensive understanding. Thought moves from particular cases toward the investigation of relationships, properties, and principles that help interpret what appears to the senses.


Ascent should not be reduced to a physical journey up a ladder. It is an intellectual movement.


A person observes a phenomenon, identifies its characteristics, compares it with other phenomena, and seeks to determine which relationships are relevant to understanding it. Thought may then advance toward more general principles that organize the interpretation.


This example illustrates a structure of reasoning, although it should not be mistaken for a literal transcription of Llull’s complete method.


Ascent involves a change in the level of analysis. The observer moves beyond considering an isolated occurrence and begins to investigate the structure that might explain it.


For example, observing a plant is different from understanding the processes that allow it to grow. Recognizing that an animal responds to stimuli is different from investigating the sensory capacities involved in its behavior. Observing the movement of a celestial body is different from developing an astronomical theory to explain that movement.


The difference lies in the movement from particular experience toward conceptual understanding.


In Llull’s system, this movement has a metaphysical dimension that is not limited to empirical science. The intellect also ascends toward spiritual realities and knowledge of God, according to the author’s Christian understanding of the universe.


Lullian ascent is therefore both epistemological and theological. It is a journey of knowledge and a way of orienting inquiry toward an understanding of the order of creation.


This movement requires recognizing that, although the senses are fundamental, they do not exhaust the possibilities of the intellect. What we perceive is the beginning of inquiry, not necessarily its conclusion.


At the same time, ascent does not authorize arbitrary conclusions. The fact that an idea is abstract, comprehensive, or spiritually meaningful does not guarantee that it is true.


Thought must justify the relationships it establishes. Analogy may suggest a hypothesis, but it does not automatically replace demonstration. A conceptual sequence may appear coherent even when some of its premises are invalid.


This point is particularly important for contemporary readers interested in philosophy, science, and religion. Ascent can inspire the search for broader explanations, but the quality of each conclusion depends on the arguments and evidence appropriate to the question being investigated.


The upward movement thus represents the ambition to move beyond immediate appearances and seek a deeper understanding of the structure of reality.


## 13. Descent: Returning from Principles to Particular Things


The second movement is descent. If ascent seeks to move from experience toward a broader understanding, descent allows the intellect to return from general principles and relationships to the interpretation of particular things.


This direction is fundamental because it prevents knowledge from remaining entirely abstract.


A theory must be applied to concrete situations if its explanatory value is to be assessed. A general principle should help interpret particular cases rather than remain isolated from the reality it is supposed to organize.


In Lullian thought, the possibility of ascending and descending is associated with the idea that different levels of reality are connected in ways that allow the intellect to move between them. Creation can be investigated through sensible things, but it can also be understood through higher principles.


Descent is therefore not simply an abandonment of higher knowledge. It is a way of returning to particular reality with a more comprehensive understanding of the relationships that may help explain it.


In a contemporary analogy, a researcher may formulate a general model and then examine whether it adequately explains concrete phenomena. If the results do not correspond to expectations, the researcher may need to revise the premises, the reasoning, or the application of the model.


This example illustrates a modern form of reasoning. It does not mean that Llull’s treatise presents the scientific method as it exists today.


The essential point is that understanding requires movement between different levels of analysis. A theory that cannot explain the particular cases it is intended to cover faces a problem. An observation that cannot be related to any explanatory structure may remain fragmented.


Ascent and descent thus form two complementary directions of knowledge.


Ascent makes it possible to seek principles. Descent allows us to examine how those principles relate to particular reality. Thought needs to maintain a relationship between the two if it is to develop a coherent interpretation.


The image of the ladder gains depth precisely because it does not present only one privileged direction. The intellect need not remain at the top to demonstrate that it has understood something. It must also return to the world of experience, differences, and concrete situations.


Descent can be understood as the point at which a general understanding encounters the diversity of reality.


This dimension also allows a contemporary ethical reflection. Knowing abstract principles is not enough if those principles do not inform the way we act in concrete situations. Discussing justice, responsibility, or dignity is different from applying those concepts to decisions that affect other people.


This ethical application, however, should be recognized as a contemporary interpretation rather than a literal passage from the medieval treatise. The historical point concerns the relationship between levels of knowledge; the moral extension depends on the reader’s philosophical analysis.


## 14. The Relationship Between Ascent and Descent: Why the Two Movements Belong Together


The title of the work presents two movements, and eliminating either one would impoverish our interpretation of the whole.


Ascent without descent could turn knowledge into a pursuit of abstractions increasingly distant from experience. Thought might reach general principles without demonstrating how they help us understand particular things.


Descent without ascent, on the other hand, could limit inquiry to a collection of disconnected observations. The observer might describe individual cases without seeking to understand the broader relationships that organize them.


The complementarity of the two movements offers a response to this problem.


Knowledge must advance toward a broader understanding, but it must also return to the objects and situations that motivated the inquiry. Movement between different levels allows us to establish relationships that might not be evident when each level is considered in isolation.


This structure should not be confused with the claim that every form of knowledge always follows a linear sequence. Actual inquiry can involve reversals, revisions, impasses, and changes of perspective. The ladder is a conceptual representation, not a universal description of every cognitive operation.


Nevertheless, the image expresses an important requirement: understanding something involves recognizing both its particular properties and the relationships that connect it to a broader structure.


The complementarity of the two movements also helps distinguish knowledge from the mere accumulation of information.


Accumulating data does not guarantee an understanding of what those data mean. Formulating a theory does not guarantee that it corresponds to reality. Inquiry requires justified relationships among observations, concepts, and conclusions.


Within Llull’s medieval framework, this movement between levels is integrated into a metaphysics of creation. For contemporary readers, it can also be studied as a proposal about the organization of thought.


These two possibilities do not erase the differences between their historical contexts. Historical interpretation seeks to understand what the author was attempting to accomplish. Philosophical interpretation examines the structure of his ideas. Contemporary application investigates what that structure might suggest for present-day problems.


All three dimensions can inform one another, but they should not be confused.


## 15. The Ladder as an Instrument of Knowledge: Classification, Comparison, and Analogy


One of the most important characteristics of Lullian thought is its search for relationships among concepts. Classifying beings does not merely place each entity in a position. It also makes comparisons and inferences possible.


Classification identifies relevant characteristics and organizes entities according to particular criteria. Comparison examines similarities and differences. Analogy seeks to understand a relationship in one domain by considering another relationship that appears structurally similar.


These operations serve different purposes and must be used carefully.


Classification does not prove that two entities in the same category share every property. Similarity between two objects does not demonstrate that they are identical. Analogy can help formulate a hypothesis, but it does not guarantee that the hypothesis is true.


The Lullian ladder provides a framework in which differences among levels of reality can be organized without treating each level as completely disconnected from the others.


This organization is part of the broader ambition of the *Ars*. Llull sought to develop a method of inquiry capable of combining principles and relationships to produce arguments and investigate philosophical and theological questions.


The project is notable for its scope. Rather than treating logic merely as a formal technique detached from other areas of inquiry, Llull sought to integrate argumentative structure into a general vision of reality.


His method, however, should not be confused with contemporary computing systems, modern mathematical logic, or artificial intelligence algorithms. Formal similarities may exist between systems that combine elements, but those similarities do not establish historical or conceptual identity.


Llull’s work can inspire comparisons with the history of logic and with later attempts to systematize knowledge. Such comparisons must identify which features are genuinely shared and which belong to different intellectual contexts.


The value of the ladder does not depend on claiming that it anticipated every later form of classification. Its importance lies in showing how a conceptual structure can organize a theory of relationships among beings and the movements of the intellect.


## 16. The Influence of Medieval Metaphysics: Order, Purpose, and Participation


The ladder of beings belongs to an intellectual context in which reality was often understood as an ordered structure possessing purpose and meaning.


This conception developed across different philosophical and religious traditions. Medieval Christian thought engaged with ancient philosophical inheritances, particularly elements of Platonism and Aristotelianism, while also participating in debates that were shared, in different ways, with Jewish and Muslim thinkers.


We should not conclude, however, that all these systems defended the same hierarchy or that Llull simply reproduced a single tradition without modification.


An author’s originality may lie in the way inherited concepts are selected, reorganized, and connected. In Llull’s case, the scale of beings is linked to his particular methodology and to the conviction that the order of creation can be investigated through intelligible relationships.


The idea of purpose is also relevant. In a teleological worldview, beings may be understood in relation to ends or functions attributed to them. This perspective differs from an explanation that describes causal mechanisms without assuming a metaphysical purpose.


Modern science uses teleological explanations only in carefully defined senses, such as certain functional descriptions in biology. It does not depend on the same medieval theological framework to explain natural phenomena.


The ladder should therefore be read as a document of a historical way of understanding the universe, not as a scientific theory competing directly with contemporary models.


This historical context does not diminish its philosophical value. It helps identify the question the ladder seeks to answer: How can the multiplicity of beings be understood within an ordered structure?


Llull’s answer begins with a religious conception of creation. Contemporary scholarship can examine this answer, compare its assumptions with other traditions, and evaluate its significance for the history of philosophy.


## 17. The Limits of the Intellect: Knowing Does Not Mean Possessing the Whole Truth


Llull’s universal ambition should not be confused with the idea that human beings already possess every answer immediately.


The structure of the ladder itself presupposes differences among levels of knowledge. The intellect begins in one domain and seeks to advance toward another, establishing relationships that must be understood.


If every level were equally accessible from the outset, the image of ascent would lose much of its meaning.


Within medieval thought, the human intellect possesses specific capacities and limitations. It depends on sensory experience for many of its operations, uses reason to investigate relationships, and seeks to understand realities that, in Llull’s theological framework, exceed ordinary experience.


The fact that the intellect seeks truth does not mean that it always succeeds or does so without difficulty.


This distinction remains relevant to contemporary epistemology. Human knowledge is developed under limited conditions. Researchers work with incomplete data, models that may be revised, and hypotheses subject to testing. A conclusion can be well supported without being final.


Modern scientific methodology is not the same as Llull’s method, but the comparison helps reveal a shared concern with organizing reasoning. The difference lies in the criteria used to evaluate arguments and the ways in which conclusions are tested.


In Llull’s framework, the intellect seeks to ascend toward an intelligible order. In contemporary critical analysis, we must also ask how we know whether the movement from one level to another is justified.


A persuasive analogy is not enough. A deeply meaningful belief does not automatically become demonstrated knowledge. A coherent system may still depend on premises that not everyone accepts.


Philosophical analysis must therefore examine both the structure of arguments and the assumptions that support them.


This approach does not require rejecting metaphysics in advance. It requires recognizing the difference between understanding a position, accepting its foundations, and demonstrating its conclusions.


The study of a medieval work becomes richer when it avoids both uncritical admiration and automatic rejection. We can recognize the historical importance of a system, understand its internal coherence, and still evaluate its limitations.


## 18. The Ladder and the Ethics of Knowledge: A Contemporary Interpretation


At this point, we move into a contemporary philosophical reflection inspired by the structure of the work. The distinction should be explicit: the discussion of the ethical use of knowledge must not be presented as a literal summary of a central thesis in Llull unless specific textual evidence supports that attribution.


The ladder organizes beings according to a hierarchy of capacities and metaphysical positions. This image allows a contemporary reader to ask an additional question: What happens when the ability to understand and transform reality is exercised without responsibility?


Humanity has developed tools capable of altering environments, exploiting natural resources, modifying organisms, and profoundly reorganizing the conditions of life for other species. These capacities demonstrate the reach of technical knowledge, but they do not automatically resolve the question of how that knowledge should be used.


Technical control over something does not necessarily mean that we understand it in every relevant respect. Nor does it guarantee that the consequences of an intervention will be just or sustainable.


A person may master a procedure without understanding all its implications. A society may produce large quantities of goods without adequately considering the environmental and social costs involved. An organization may achieve efficiency in a particular task without evaluating whether its objective is morally acceptable.


This is where the image of the ladder acquires a possible ethical interpretation. Intellectual ability should not be confused with unlimited permission to transform everything within our reach.


The question is not merely what we can do, but what reasons justify our actions, what consequences we can anticipate, and what limits should guide our decisions.


This reflection does not require us to claim that every being occupies an identical moral position or that all human interventions are unjustifiable. It requires us to distinguish capacity, purpose, and responsibility.


The same question can be applied to human relationships. History records situations in which certain groups were classified as inferior to justify the exploitation of their labor, the restriction of their rights, or the denial of their dignity.


These practices do not follow inevitably from every philosophical hierarchy. A medieval ontological classification should not automatically be equated with modern social hierarchies. History nevertheless shows that classifications of superiority can be abused when they are turned into justifications for domination.


Contemporary reflection must investigate this transition: How does a descriptive difference become a moral or political justification?


Recognizing that two entities possess different capacities does not, by itself, demonstrate that one has the right to exploit the other without limits. Additional premises would be needed to reach that conclusion, and those premises must be examined critically.


This distinction is particularly important in debates about animals. Differences in capacities among species do not automatically settle questions concerning suffering, welfare, exploitation, or human responsibility.


It is equally relevant to technology. The possibility of building increasingly capable systems does not, by itself, answer every question about their purposes, their control, or their consequences.


Llull’s ladder does not provide ready-made answers to these modern problems. It offers a conceptual image that can help us formulate questions about knowledge, order, and responsibility.


The contemporary ethical interpretation begins by recognizing that the capacity to act upon the world does not eliminate the need to justify our actions.


## 19. A Contemporary Reading of Hierarchy: Between Description and Domination


Hierarchy can be used to describe differences among entities, but it can also be used to legitimize relations of power. These two functions are not equivalent.


A scientific classification may distinguish organisms according to biological characteristics without claiming that some possess greater moral worth. A social classification, by contrast, may be used to establish privileges, restrict rights, or justify exclusion.


The transition from classification to domination requires its own analysis. Finding a hierarchy in a philosophical system is not enough to conclude that the system necessarily endorses every form of oppression.


In Llull’s case, the ladder belongs to a theological order of creation. Contemporary interpretation must respect that context and avoid attributing positions to the author that have not been established through the text.


At the same time, we can investigate how the image of a ladder encourages us to think about the limits of superiority.


If a human being considers themselves superior in a particular capacity, does that automatically give them the right to use every other being as an instrument? The answer does not follow from the observation of a difference in capacities alone. It requires an additional ethical argument.


The question can also be applied to knowledge. A person who understands a problem better does not, solely for that reason, acquire the right to impose any decision on others. Knowledge may establish a special responsibility, but it does not eliminate the need to justify choices and consider their effects.


When hierarchy is treated as an absolute measure of value, it can produce confusion. Greater expertise in one field does not make someone morally superior in every respect. Greater resources do not guarantee that someone is right in every dispute. Control over a technology does not mean full understanding of its consequences.


This reflection opens a space for distinguishing competence, power, and wisdom.


Competence involves the ability to perform tasks or understand a particular domain. Power involves the ability to produce effects and influence decisions. Wisdom, in a philosophical sense, also requires discernment about ends, limits, and consequences.


These definitions are contemporary analytical tools, not terms that should be attributed literally to Llull without textual verification.


The ladder of knowledge can therefore be used to pose a question to humanity itself: As we expand our ability to understand and modify the world, do we also expand our willingness to critically evaluate what we do?


The answer cannot be assumed. It must be examined in practice.


## 20. The Work Between Medieval Theology and Contemporary Philosophy


Several centuries separate Ramon Llull from contemporary readers. During that time, conceptions of nature, matter, life, intelligence, society, and the universe have changed profoundly.


Medieval cosmology is not equivalent to modern astronomy. Medieval classifications of beings are not equivalent to contemporary biological taxonomy. Llull’s concept of the intellect cannot simply be equated with current theories of mind or computational systems.


These differences are essential to a rigorous reading.


Nevertheless, a philosophical work can remain valuable beyond the answers originally offered. This happens when its questions, argumentative structures, or conceptual images allow us to investigate problems that remain relevant.


In *Liber de ascensu et descensu intellectus*, at least four questions stand out.


The first is epistemological: How does the intellect move from particular experience toward an understanding of more general relationships?


The second is metaphysical: In what sense can different levels of reality be understood as parts of an ordered whole?


The third is methodological: How can abstract principles be related to concrete phenomena without losing contact with the reality they are meant to explain?


The fourth is ethical, as a contemporary extension: How should we evaluate the use of intellectual and technical capacities that allow us to transform reality?


These questions do not have identical answers in every historical period. Modern scientific inquiry uses criteria that do not belong to Llull’s original system, while contemporary philosophies offer very different positions on metaphysics, religion, and ethics.


Comparison must therefore be critical and historically informed.


We do not need to claim that Llull anticipated modern science to recognize that his work represents an important attempt to systematize knowledge. Nor do we need to accept his theology to understand the architecture of his thought.


A reader can study the ladder as part of the history of medieval philosophy, examine its relationship with the *Ars*, and then evaluate which elements offer possibilities for interpretation in the present.


The historical significance of a work does not depend on its having answered every question that arose in later centuries. It also depends on its ability to reveal how a particular age sought to understand reality and what place it assigned to the human intellect in that undertaking.


## 21. How to Read the Ladder Without Confusing Interpretation with Historical Fact


A multidisciplinary examination of Ramon Llull requires us to distinguish the kinds of claims we make about his work.


When we state that the treatise is titled *Liber de ascensu et descensu intellectus*, that its composition is dated to March 1305, or that a printed edition appeared in Valencia in 1512, we are dealing with verifiable historical and bibliographic information.


When we explain the ladder as a structure connecting different degrees of existence and knowledge, we are offering an interpretation based on scholarship on Lullian philosophy.


When we ask whether this structure can inspire reflection on responsibility, technology, exploitation, or the limits of power, we are proposing a contemporary application.


All three dimensions are legitimate, but they do not have the same status.


Historical claims should be supported by relevant documents and scholarship. Philosophical interpretations should provide reasons for the proposed reading. Contemporary applications should explain how older concepts are being used and what changes of context are involved.


This care is especially necessary when a medieval image is associated with modern theories of intelligence, biology, society, or technology. A conceptual resemblance may be interesting without demonstrating direct influence or identity of thought.


The ladder of beings, for example, can be compared with other hierarchical models. But that comparison does not prove that Llull anticipated evolutionary biology, artificial intelligence, or any contemporary theory of consciousness.


The most productive approach is to identify both similarities and differences. What does the image help us understand? What assumptions does it contain? Where does its application become inappropriate? Which conclusions depend on medieval theology, and which can be formulated independently of it?


These questions do not diminish the work. They make the investigation more precise.


## 22. A Synthesis of the Work’s Philosophical Content: Its Main Themes


The historical and conceptual discussion above allows us to bring together the principal themes for interpreting *Liber de ascensu et descensu intellectus*.


**First theme: Reality as an ordered whole.** The work is associated with the conception that beings can be organized according to degrees and properties within a structure that, for Llull, belongs to divine creation.


**Second theme: Distinctions among levels of being.** Matter, plant life, animal perception, imagination, human reason, the heavens, angels, and God belong to different categories within Lullian cosmology. The ladder seeks to make these differences intelligible.


**Third theme: The intellect as a capacity to move between levels.** The intellect is not confined to immediate perception. It can investigate relationships, construct interpretations, and seek broader principles.


**Fourth theme: Ascent.** The upward movement represents the passage from sensible things toward more general levels of understanding and, within Llull’s theological framework, toward the investigation of spiritual realities.


**Fifth theme: Descent.** The downward movement makes it possible to return from principles to the understanding of particular things, maintaining a relationship between the general structure of knowledge and concrete reality.


**Sixth theme: Analogy and comparison.** The intelligibility of the world depends in part on the possibility of identifying relationships among different levels without erasing the distinctions that characterize them.


**Seventh theme: The relationship between intellect and metaphysics.** Lullian inquiry is not purely descriptive. It is integrated into a Christian conception of creation, cosmic order, and God as the supreme principle.


**Eighth theme: The ambition to develop a general method.** The work belongs to Llull’s broader intellectual project, which sought systematic procedures for investigating different philosophical and theological questions.


**Ninth theme: The limits of contemporary interpretation.** Modern applications must distinguish the historical content of the treatise from contemporary interpretations and hypotheses built upon it.


These themes show why the work should not be reduced to a drawing of a ladder. The image summarizes a much broader problem: the relationship between the organization of reality and the movements of the intellect that seeks to understand it.


The ladder is both a representation of the order of beings and an image of the journey of knowledge. Its significance lies in the way these two dimensions are connected within Ramon Llull’s medieval thought.


## 23. Philosophical Reflection — The Ladder of Knowledge and the Responsibility to Understand


Ramon Llull’s ladder can serve as the starting point for a reflection that extends beyond the boundaries of medieval cosmology. To do so, however, we must preserve the distinction between what the author actually developed and the questions his work allows us to formulate today.


The first problem concerns the relationship between knowledge and understanding. A person can accumulate information without fully understanding what it means. Someone can master technical procedures without knowing all the consequences of applying them. A person can develop sophisticated explanations without adequately examining the assumptions on which those explanations rest.


Knowledge, therefore, should not be confused with a collection of information or with the mere ability to produce results. Understanding involves establishing relationships, evaluating arguments, and recognizing the limits of one’s conclusions.


Llull’s ladder offers an interesting image for this problem. The intellect begins at one level, investigates relationships, and seeks a more comprehensive understanding. But the movement from one rung to another should not be interpreted as permission to abandon concrete reality. The movement of descent reminds us that thought must return to particular things and examine how its interpretations relate to what they claim to explain.


The second question concerns the relationship between intellectual ability and responsibility.


Humanity has developed knowledge that makes it possible to transform environments, modify organisms, produce complex technological systems, and influence the living conditions of other species. These abilities expand our possibilities for action, but they do not automatically justify every use of those abilities.


It is possible to produce something technically efficient that remains ethically questionable. It is possible to achieve an immediate goal while causing negative consequences that have not been adequately considered. It is possible to exercise power over other beings without fully understanding their needs, interests, or the effects of that relationship.


The distinction between capacity and responsibility therefore becomes a central question in contemporary reflection.


It would be inaccurate to claim that Llull presented a modern theory of technological ethics. His thought belongs to another historical context and is grounded in a Christian understanding of creation. Nevertheless, we can use the structure of the ladder to formulate a contemporary question: If knowledge allows us to intervene more deeply in reality, what criteria should guide those interventions?


The question has no simple answer. It requires us to examine purposes, consequences, limits, and responsibilities.


The third question concerns the danger of turning hierarchies into absolute justifications for power.


The medieval scale organizes beings according to ontological degrees and distinct capacities. But classification does not automatically settle every moral question. Identifying differences among beings does not demonstrate that every form of exploitation is legitimate.


This distinction matters in human relationships, in the treatment of animals, and in the development of technologies capable of affecting other people.


A difference in capacity does not, by itself, provide a sufficient justification for denying moral consideration to those with different capacities. Reaching an ethical conclusion requires additional arguments and an examination of their consequences.


This reflection should not be attributed literally to Llull without textual support. It is a contemporary interpretation that uses the structure of his work to investigate present-day problems.


The fourth question concerns the limits of the intellect itself.


The ladder suggests that different levels of knowledge exist and that the intellect can investigate relationships among them. It does not mean that every person can reach every truth or that every abstract conclusion is necessarily valid.


Human intelligence can produce knowledge, but it can also make mistakes. It can establish legitimate relationships or construct misleading analogies. It can recognize evidence or select only information that confirms a prior conviction.


The search for truth therefore requires more than intellectual enthusiasm. It requires a willingness to revise interpretations in light of new information, acknowledge uncertainty, and distinguish what has been demonstrated from what remains hypothetical.


This critical attitude is compatible with the historical study of Llull, although its contemporary formulation should not be confused with his specific method.


The fifth question concerns the meaning of ascent itself.


If we interpret ascent merely as the achievement of a superior position, we risk reducing the image to a competition for status. In Llull’s historical framework, however, ascent is fundamentally an intellectual and metaphysical movement: the pursuit of a broader understanding of reality.


To ascend does not necessarily mean dominating other people or accumulating power. Within the philosophical horizon of the work, it means advancing in the investigation of principles and relationships that make the world intelligible.


This distinction offers an important reflection for the present. A society can dramatically expand its technological capabilities without achieving an equivalent increase in its ability to judge how those capabilities should be used.


Technical progress and moral progress are not automatically identical. They must be examined according to their own criteria.


Finally, Llull’s ladder invites us to ask whether understanding reality means merely knowing how things work or also reflecting on the place we occupy within that reality.


The question does not require a single answer. It can be investigated through philosophy, science, history, and ethics, provided each field preserves its methods and standards of argument.


Ramon Llull’s contribution lies in his attempt to organize knowledge as a journey through different levels of understanding. Our contemporary responsibility is to study that proposal without anachronism while asking what it may still teach us.


## 24. Conclusion — The Ladder Remains a Question About Knowledge


*Liber de ascensu et descensu intellectus* occupies a significant place in Ramon Llull’s body of work because it expresses one of the central ambitions of his thought: to understand reality through an ordered structure of relationships and to explain how the intellect can move through different levels of knowledge.


The ladder associated with the work is more than a visual representation of a hierarchy. It summarizes a philosophical conception in which beings possess distinct characteristics, reality has an intelligible order, and the human intellect can investigate that order through upward and downward movements.


Ascent represents the search for a broader understanding, beginning with experience and moving toward more general principles. Descent allows the intellect to return from those principles to the interpretation of particular things. The two movements complement one another because knowledge requires both the investigation of general relationships and the examination of concrete reality.


The structure of the ladder belongs to medieval Christian metaphysics. God stands at its summit, understood by Llull as the supreme principle of creation. This theological dimension should neither be removed to make the work appear more modern nor confused with contemporary scientific theories.


To understand Llull historically, we must recognize the differences between his cosmology and contemporary conceptions of matter, life, intelligence, and the universe. Comparisons across historical periods can be productive, but they should not turn conceptual similarities into claims of scientific anticipation.


The work’s value also lies in the way it reveals a medieval attempt to connect knowledge, metaphysics, and rational organization. Llull sought to construct a system capable of investigating different areas of reality, integrating the ladder of beings into his broader project of the *Ars*.


This ambition helps explain why his thought continues to attract historical and philosophical scholarship. His work is not confined to a single discipline, and its conceptual structure offers opportunities for investigating the history of logic, epistemology, and the relationships between philosophy and theology.


Contemporary reflections inspired by the ladder must nevertheless be identified as interpretations. The relationship between knowledge and responsibility, the critique of the abusive use of hierarchies, and the distinction between technical ability and moral discernment are relevant subjects today. They should not, however, be presented as though they necessarily constituted the literal content of the medieval treatise.


Preserving this distinction is an essential part of rigorous inquiry.


Llull’s ladder can be read as a representation of a metaphysical order, a model of intellectual movement, and a document in the history of ideas. Each perspective illuminates a different aspect of the work.


Perhaps its most enduring question concerns the relationship between the two movements announced in the title. It is not enough to remain at the level of immediate experience without seeking to understand the relationships that organize what we perceive. Nor is it enough to construct abstract principles without examining how they relate to concrete reality.


Knowledge requires us to establish connections, evaluate arguments, and recognize the limits of what we know.


Within Llull’s framework, this journey leads toward the investigation of creation and its divine foundation. For contemporary readers, it can also provide an opportunity to examine how different traditions have sought to understand reality and what place they have assigned to the human intellect in that endeavor.


Studying the work does not require accepting every one of its premises. It requires understanding, contextualizing, and critically examining them.


The ladder thus remains a historical image of an extraordinary intellectual ambition: to understand the multiplicity of the world without losing sight of the relationships that allow us to organize it in thought.


The question it leaves us with is not simply how many rungs we can climb. It is how we know what we encounter on each rung, what reasons support our conclusions, and how far the intellect can advance without confusing the search for truth with the certainty that it already possesses it.


---


## Complete Bibliography and Further Reading


The following bibliography brings together the primary text, scholarly editions, specialist studies, and academic reference resources. It distinguishes sources directly related to the treatise from broader references on Ramon Llull’s philosophy and intellectual career.


### 1. Primary Source: Ramon Llull’s Treatise


**LLULL, Ramon.** *Liber de ascensu et descensu intellectus*. In: *Raimundi Lulli Opera Latina*. Vol. IX. Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 1981. *Corpus Christianorum, Continuatio Mediaevalis*, vol. 35, pp. 1–199.


This is the essential reference for studying the Latin text in a modern critical edition. It is the principal source for researchers who wish to examine the treatise directly, verify its structure, and investigate its concepts in greater depth.


**LLULL, Ramon.** *Raymundi Lulij ... De noua logica, de correllatiuis, necnon et de ascensu et descensu intellectus*. Valencia: Jorge Costilla, 1512.


A historical printed edition bringing together Lullian texts related to logic, correlatives, and the ascent and descent of the intellect. Its bibliographic record and a digital reproduction are referenced by the Biblioteca Virtual Miguel de Cervantes.


The 1512 edition should be distinguished from the medieval composition of the work, dated to 1305. citeturn201701search1turn201701search3


### 2. Bibliographic Catalogs and Research Tools


**BONNER, Anthony.** *Obres selectes de Ramon Llull (1232–1316).* 2 vols. Palma de Mallorca: Editorial Moll, 1989.


An important edition for the study of Llull’s writings and the consultation of his bibliographic catalog. The second volume includes a chronological catalog used as a reference for dating Lullian works.


**ROGENT, Elies; DURAN, Estanislau.** *Bibliografía de les impressions lul·lianes*. Barcelona, 1927.


A historical bibliography of printed editions of Ramon Llull’s works. It is useful for studying publication history and identifying early printed editions.


**INSTITUTO BRASILEIRO DE FILOSOFIA E CIÊNCIA RAIMUNDO LÚLIO.** *Chronological Catalog of the Works of Ramon Llull*, based on Anthony Bonner’s catalog. Available at: https://www.ramonllull.net/sw_studies/l_br/s_catalogo.html


A reference resource providing chronological information, publication details, and data concerning the manuscript and printed transmission of Llull’s works. The entry for *Liber de ascensu et descensu intellectus* records March 1305 in Montpellier as its date and place of composition. citeturn201701search1


### 3. General Studies of Ramon Llull’s Philosophy


**BONNER, Anthony (ed. and trans.).** *Selected Works of Ramon Llull (1232–1316).* 2 vols. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985.


A collection of Llull’s writings edited and translated by Anthony Bonner. It is an important reference for understanding the range of his work and the relationship among his philosophical, literary, and religious writings.


**BONNER, Anthony (ed. and trans.).** *Doctor Illuminatus: A Ramon Llull Reader.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993.


An introductory anthology of Lullian texts, including material on his life, thought, and intellectual tradition. It is useful for readers who want to explore different aspects of his work before undertaking a more specialized study of individual treatises.


**BONNER, Anthony (trans.).** *Ramon Llull: A Contemporary Life.* Woodbridge, Suffolk: Tamesis, 2010.


An English translation of *Vita coaetanea*, the medieval biographical account of Llull’s life. It is useful for examining the traditional account of his conversion and intellectual mission while keeping in mind the historical character of the source.


### 4. Academic Encyclopedias and Research Resources


**PRIANI, Ernesto.** “Ramon Llull.” *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. First published February 10, 2017; substantive revision February 24, 2025. Available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/llull/


A major scholarly reference on Llull’s life, metaphysics, theory of knowledge, and *Ars*. The entry provides a systematic overview of his philosophy and a specialized bibliography for further research. It also discusses the hierarchy of beings and the relationship between the ladder of knowledge and Llull’s metaphysics. citeturn201701search0


**BIBLIOTECA VIRTUAL MIGUEL DE CERVANTES.** *Liber de ascensu et descensu intellectus* (Ms. 1870). Bibliographic record for a manuscript preserved at the University of Salamanca. Available at: https://www.cervantesvirtual.com/portales/editores_editoriales_iberoamericanos_en/obra/liber-de-ascensu-et-descensu-intellectus-ms-1870-1224456/


A bibliographic record for a medieval manuscript of the treatise. The manuscript provides evidence of the work’s transmission before the age of printing. citeturn201701search4


**SCIÈNCIA.CAT DB.** *Lullus, Raimundus: In Monte Pessulano anno MCCCV composita*. Centre de Documentació Ramon Llull, University of Barcelona. Available at: https://sciencia.cat/db/cercador.htm?bib=16741


A scholarly bibliographic database documenting the 1981 critical edition of Llull’s Latin works, including *Liber de ascensu et descensu intellectus*. The record identifies the treatise as part of the volume published in *Raimundi Lulli Opera Latina*, vol. IX. citeturn201701search3


### 5. Scholarship on the Ladder, Verticality, and Interpretation


**DAVIS GONZÁLEZ, Ana.** “Obras en vertical: *Liber de ascenso et descensus intellectus* y *Descenso y ascenso del alma por la belleza*.” *Medievalia*, no. 49, 2017, pp. 73–86. DOI: https://doi.org/10.19130/medievalia.49.2017.341


A scholarly study directly concerned with the vertical dimension of Llull’s work and its comparison with another text that uses the imagery of ascent and descent. It is particularly relevant to a deeper examination of the treatise’s conceptual and visual structure.


### 6. Further Reading on the Medieval Intellectual Context


**GILSON, Étienne.** *La philosophie au Moyen Âge: des origines patristiques à la fin du XIVe siècle.* Paris: Payot, 1922.


A classic history of medieval philosophy. It can help contextualize the metaphysical, theological, and epistemological questions present in the intellectual environment in which Llull developed his thought.


**LE GOFF, Jacques.** *Intellectuals in the Middle Ages.* Translated by Teresa Lavender Fagan. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992.


A historical study of medieval intellectual life. It is useful for understanding the social and institutional contexts in which knowledge was produced, books circulated, and educational traditions developed.


**LIBERA, Alain de.** *La philosophie médiévale.* Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.


A study of medieval philosophy that provides context for understanding the diversity of intellectual traditions and the circulation of ideas across different cultural settings.


*Bibliographic note:* These additional works help contextualize medieval thought but do not replace the critical edition of *Liber de ascensu et descensu intellectus* or specialist scholarship devoted specifically to Ramon Llull.


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### Methodological and Editorial Note


This study is a historical and philosophical synthesis devoted to *Liber de ascensu et descensu intellectus*. The explanations of the ladder’s structure and the movements of the intellect are presented as an interpretive synthesis of the Lullian tradition, not as a complete translation of the treatise.


The reflections on ethics, power, technology, and responsibility are contemporary applications explicitly distinguished from the historical content of the work. They should not be treated as direct quotations or as positions Llull necessarily formulated in the same terms.


The dating of the treatise, the 1512 printed edition, and the 1981 critical edition can be checked against the bibliographic catalogs and academic resources listed above.


**Revista & Escolas de Mistérios | Multidisciplinary Encyclopedia by R.V. Garcia**


*The constant pursuit of truth: understanding the thought of earlier ages requires preserving its historical context, examining its arguments, and distinguishing documented facts, philosophical interpretations, and contemporary hypotheses.*


The main title is adapted for natural English while preserving the Latin original. I have also kept the historical description precise: Llull is identified as a Majorcan thinker of the medieval Catalan tradition, rather than simply labeled a “Spanish philosopher,” which can obscure the political and cultural context of his time.




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