OPERATION SILENCE
How the Largest Infiltration Network in Modern History Was Ignored by the Victors
MAGAZINE & SCHOOLS OF MYSTERIES
Documentary Investigation — Declassified Sources from Four Continents
EDITORIAL NOTICE: This article is a journalistic investigation based exclusively on declassified historical documents, public archives, academic works, and reports by internationally recognized researchers. Any speculative hypothesis is clearly identified as such. The purpose is to inform, not to glorify any criminal organization or ideology.
INTRODUCTION: THE DAY THE WAR ENDED—AND DIDN’T
On May 8, 1945, sirens echoed across a shattered Europe. Nazi Germany had surrendered. Newspapers around the world celebrated the fall of the most criminal regime of the twentieth century. For humanity, the war was over.
For some, it had merely changed form.
In the weeks following the surrender, while Allied generals signed treaties and diplomats drew the borders of a new world, another operation quietly began—without uniforms, flags, or public declarations. Scientists, doctors, intelligence specialists, and officers of the Third Reich simply disappeared from official records, only to reappear months or years later within the institutions of the very countries that had just defeated them.
This is the story told by declassified archives.
Not a theory.
An investigation.
ACT I — RECRUITMENT: WHEN THE VICTORS CHOSE THEIR ENEMIES
Operation Paperclip and the Price of Victory
During the summer of 1945, American intelligence agents moved through German prisoner-of-war camps carrying lists.
They were not looking for war criminals to prosecute.
They were looking for engineers.
Operation Paperclip—named after the paperclips attached to selected personnel files—became the most ambitious enemy-recruitment program in modern history. Officially classified for decades, the program transferred more than 1,600 German scientists, engineers, and technicians to the United States between 1945 and 1959.
The most famous among them was Wernher von Braun.
A member of the Nazi Party since 1937 and an SS officer since 1940, von Braun oversaw the production of V-2 rockets using forced labor from prisoners held at the Mittelbau-Dora concentration camp, where an estimated 20,000 prisoners died.
When American forces arrived, von Braun surrendered with his technical archives intact and a proposal:
He would build better rockets for the Americans.
The proposal was accepted.
By 1958, von Braun was directing the U.S. ballistic missile program. In 1969, his rockets carried human beings to the Moon. In 1975, President Gerald Ford awarded him the National Medal of Science.
For decades, his Nazi past remained largely absent from public discussion.
Historian Michael Neufeld of the Smithsonian Institution extensively documented this process in his authoritative biography of von Braun, concluding that the scientist was never held accountable for crimes committed under his direct authority.
The Soviet Side: Operation Osoaviakhim
Washington was not alone in this race.
In the early hours of October 22, 1946, Soviet forces carried out simultaneous operations across dozens of cities in the German occupation zone. Within hours, more than 2,200 German specialists and their families were loaded onto trains bound for the Soviet Union—many without enough time to pack their belongings.
Among them was Helmut Gröttrup, a rocket engineer who had worked directly with von Braun on the V-2 program.
While his former colleague built rockets for NASA, Gröttrup helped develop the Soviet Union’s first ballistic missiles in secret facilities deep within the Ural Mountains.
Historian Christoph Mick of the University of Warwick documented in Forschen für Stalin (Researching for Stalin) how Nazi technical expertise was absorbed into the Soviet space program—the same program that launched Sputnik in 1957 and sent Yuri Gagarin into space in 1961.
Two opposing sides.
The same product.
The same silence.
ACT II — THE ESCAPE: THE ROUTES OPENED BY THE VATICAN
The Ratlines: When Mercy Had an Address
While the Allies recruited scientists, many criminals escaped.
The so-called Ratlines were organized escape routes that enabled thousands of Nazis to leave Europe between 1945 and the early 1950s.
Historical investigations, documented in works such as The Real Odessa by Argentine historian Uki Goñi and Unholy Trinity by Mark Aarons and John Loftus, revealed the active involvement of elements within the Catholic Church.
Austrian Bishop Alois Hudal, rector of a German seminary in Rome, became one of the key organizers. Using his position to visit prisoners of war, Hudal obtained false documents and arranged the transfer of fugitives to South America through passports issued by the International Red Cross.
According to researchers, identity verification procedures were often inadequate.
The main route eventually came under the control of Croatian Bishop Krunoslav Draganović, whose Seminary of Saint Jerome in Rome became the primary transit hub.
Researchers estimate that more than 5,000 Nazis escaped through his network.
Among the documented beneficiaries:
-
Adolf Eichmann, chief organizer of the “Final Solution,” escaped to Argentina in 1950 using a false passport under the name Ricardo Klement. CIA records later revealed that American intelligence knew of his whereabouts as early as 1952 but took no action.
-
Josef Mengele, the “Angel of Death” of Auschwitz, responsible for medical experiments on human beings, lived in Brazil and Paraguay for decades and died without prosecution in Bertioga, São Paulo, in 1979.
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Klaus Barbie, the “Butcher of Lyon,” former Gestapo chief in occupied France, became an American intelligence asset in 1947 and was later relocated to Bolivia, where he lived under a false identity for decades.
Alois Brunner: Adviser to Syria
A lesser-known but equally documented case is that of Alois Brunner, considered by Eichmann himself to be “his best man.”
Responsible for the deportation of more than 128,000 Jews to extermination camps, Brunner fled to Syria during the 1950s.
Living in Damascus under the name Georg Fischer, he reportedly advised Syrian intelligence services, teaching interrogation and political repression techniques developed during the Nazi occupation of Europe.
Brunner was never captured.
He survived two Mossad letter-bomb attacks and reportedly died in Syria sometime during the 2000s without ever facing trial.
ACT III — INFILTRATION: THE MANUAL NO ONE WAS SUPPOSED TO SEE
Gehlen and the BND: When a Nazi Spy Founded Western Intelligence
Of all documented cases, that of General Reinhard Gehlen may be the most revealing.
During World War II, Gehlen headed German military intelligence on the Eastern Front, overseeing intelligence operations against the Soviet Union.
As Germany’s defeat became inevitable, he preserved extensive intelligence archives on Soviet activities and surrendered to the Americans with a proposal.
The Americans accepted in 1946.
The Gehlen Organization, funded by the CIA with millions of dollars, became Western Europe’s principal anti-communist intelligence service throughout the 1950s.
Its ranks included numerous former SS members.
In 1956, it was formally transformed into the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), West Germany’s official foreign intelligence service, with Gehlen as its director.
In September 2000, following a Freedom of Information Act request, the CIA officially acknowledged its relationship with Gehlen for the first time—a connection that had remained secret for half a century.
(Continued in Part II: South America, Operation Condor, the Advanced Hypothesis, Conclusions, and APA Bibliography.)
CIA DOCUMENTS AND THE COVER-UP OF NAZI WAR CRIMINALS
In 2006, the United States government released thousands of previously classified documents related to Nazi war crimes and postwar intelligence operations.
Among the records examined by University of Virginia historian Timothy Naftali were indications that Western authorities possessed information about Adolf Eichmann’s whereabouts years before his capture by Mossad agents in 1960.
Eichmann was one of the principal architects of the so-called “Final Solution,” the Nazi program responsible for the deportation of millions of Jews to extermination camps throughout Europe.
The documents suggest that West German intelligence services informed the CIA of Eichmann’s presence in Argentina as early as the 1950s. Despite this knowledge, no meaningful action was taken to apprehend him.
Researchers have argued that officials feared Eichmann’s capture could expose influential figures within the West German government, including Hans Globke, a senior aide to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and a participant in drafting the infamous Nuremberg Laws.
The records also reveal efforts to limit public disclosure of certain information, illustrating how Cold War priorities frequently influenced political and intelligence decisions during the postwar period.
---
REINHARD GEHLEN AND THE NAZI ESPIONAGE NETWORK
One of the most significant cases involves General Reinhard Gehlen.
During World War II, Gehlen served as head of German military intelligence on the Eastern Front, overseeing intelligence operations against the Soviet Union.
As Germany’s defeat became inevitable, Gehlen preserved a substantial portion of his intelligence archives concerning the Soviet Union and negotiated his cooperation with the United States.
His intelligence organization was subsequently absorbed by American authorities and funded for years by U.S. intelligence agencies. Over time, it evolved into the foundation of West Germany’s foreign intelligence service, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND).
Many former members of Gehlen’s organization had direct ties to Nazi institutions and organizations.
The strategic rationale was straightforward: U.S. officials believed these intelligence specialists possessed valuable knowledge about the Soviet Union and could assist in containing communist expansion during the early Cold War.
The moral implications of that decision, however, remain the subject of intense historical debate to this day.
Critics argue that the recruitment and protection of former Nazi personnel compromised efforts to bring war criminals to justice. Supporters of the policy have contended that the geopolitical realities of the Cold War led American and Western European intelligence services to prioritize anti-Soviet operations over postwar prosecutions.
The Gehlen case remains one of the most controversial examples of how former Nazi officials were integrated into Western intelligence structures after World War II and how Cold War priorities often overshadowed accountability for wartime atrocities.
# MYSTERY MAGAZINE & SCHOOLS
### THE UNITED STATES FINALLY REVEALS IT CONCEALED NAZIS
**Posted by Rodrigo Veronezi Garcia on November 16, 2010**
#### Documents show that the CIA covered up Nazi war crimes during the post-war period
**By Shmuel Rosner, Haaretz Correspondent**
This information, as well as the pressure West Germany exerted on the Central Intelligence Agency to prevent the leak of sensitive information, is detailed in hundreds of recently declassified documents released by the U.S. government on Tuesday.
The government released a total of 27,000 CIA documents related to Nazi war crimes during World War II on Tuesday morning. The documents include information about the American intelligence agency's employment of Nazi war criminals.
The documents were declassified as part of an interagency effort to release material related to Japanese and German war criminals from World War II. Since the initiative began in 1999, more than eight million documents have been released.
The material released on Tuesday titles many cases in which former SS members were employed in Germany and other countries for espionage purposes. In one case, a team of agents, manned by a number of war criminals, was deployed in Germany under the code name "Passime" (*passatempo*). Their mission was to provide the U.S. with intelligence from Germany in the event of a Soviet invasion.
Timothy Naftali, a historian at the University of Virginia and author of a document summarizing the material in the released records, wrote that they contribute significant details to previously known information.
The new material, he said, suggests that West German intelligence provided information that it could have arrested the fugitive and war criminal Adolf Eichmann in the 1950s, but was concerned about the effect such an action could have on then-Minister Dr. Hans Globke, director of the Federal Chancellery.
Eichmann was ultimately captured by Mossad agents in Buenos Aires in 1960. He was tried by an Israeli court and hanged in 1962.
Globke, a former senior Nazi associate and close ally of then-Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, was one of the authors of the Nuremberg Laws in the 1930s. But in the 1950s, according to Naftali, he was the chancellor's main point of contact with American intelligence.
According to the declassified documents, a German intelligence officer informed the CIA in March 1958 that Germany had known since 1952 that Eichmann was living in Argentina under the alias "Clemens." The information was not entirely accurate, as the name Eichmann used at the time was "Clemente."
However, the CIA did not want to make use of the information.
Israeli intelligence officials who published their memoirs wrote that Israel knew Eichmann was living in Argentina in 1957 but had no information regarding his alias.
According to Naftali, Israeli agents gave up their search for a time because, without a name, it was difficult to locate him in Argentina.
The documents also reveal that the CIA, responding to a request from West Germany, asked *Life Magazine*—which planned to publish Eichmann's memoirs in 1960—to exclude any mention of Globke from them.
Eichmann had been arrested by Mossad agents earlier that year, and his family sold his memoirs to the magazine to pay for his legal defense.
Allen Dulles, then-director of the CIA, wrote to his West German counterpart in September 1960, assuring him that a "minor" mention of Globke in the memoirs would be suppressed under the terms of the CIA's request.
*(Photo: Adolf Eichmann speaking during his trial in 1961. Archive)*
### CIA Admits Nazi Connection
**Introduction by Robert Lederman (09/26/2000), followed by the UPI article**
www.tenc.net | **[The Emperor's Clothes]**
Conspicuous by its silence, the media that the CIA owns and influences has provided virtually no coverage of what could be one of the biggest stories in decades. Only UPI issued any statement regarding the CIA's admission that Hitler's top general in World War II, next in command of espionage, transferred his entire network of thousands of spies and double agents to what became the newly formed CIA.
What makes this much more than an interesting footnote is that the internal and external history, the entire history of the CIA, was shaped by these former Nazis, whose ideas on eugenics, race, social control, biological warfare, and propaganda dominate the policies of countless "think tanks" like the Rockefeller Foundation and the funded Manhattan Institute, and have influenced the U.S. government at its highest levels.
During the past five decades, numerous isolated revelations about Nazis imported to America by the Dulles brothers, William Casey, and others broke the media silence. These stories usually revolve around former concentration camp guards who hid their identities when they emigrated. What makes this different is that General Gehlen was the No. 1 Nazi in this program. By acknowledging the CIA's connection to Gehlen, the entire can of worms can now be opened.
For excellent published works on the Nazi/CIA connection, read: *"Trading with the Enemy"* by Charles Higham, *"The Secret War Against the Jews"* by Loftus and Aarons, or *"Blowback"* by Christopher Simpson.
For my articles on the connection to Mayor Giuliani and the Bush family, see: http://Baltech.org/lederman/spray/
### CIA Says Nazi General Was Source of Intelligence
**From 09/20/2000 UPI 8:28 PM (ET)**
**COLLEGE PARK, Md., Sept. 20 (UPI) —** The Central Intelligence Agency, for the first time, confirmed that a high-ranking Nazi general placed his Soviet counterintelligence spy ring at the disposal of the United States during the early days of the Cold War.
The National Archives said in a Wednesday release that the CIA had filed a statement in U.S. District Court "acknowledging an intelligence relationship with German General Reinhard Gehlen, which has been kept secret for 50 years."
"The CIA's announcement marks the first acknowledgment by that agency that it had any relationship with Gehlen and clears the way for the declassification of records about the relationship," the National Archives said.
Gehlen was Hitler's senior intelligence officer on the Eastern Front during the war and transferred his expertise and contacts to the U.S. as World War II reached its climax. While Gehlen's relationship with U.S. intelligence during the 1940s and 1950s has been the subject of about five books over the years, the eventual release of CIA documents related to the development of his European spy network could shed new light on the origins of the Cold War and early U.S. espionage efforts against Moscow.
Gehlen's network of agents in Europe—including many with Nazi pasts who were rescued from POW camps by U.S. intelligence officers—became known as the Gehlen Organization and received millions of dollars in U.S. funding until 1956.
The CIA's acknowledgment of its relations with Gehlen came in response to an appeal of a Freedom of Information Act request by researcher Carl Oglesby, the National Archives said. The agency committed to releasing its records in general, in accordance with the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act.
The law created the Interagency Nazi War Criminal Records Working Group (IWG), which for more than two years has been declassifying documents related to World War II war crimes and releasing them through the National Archives.
"This shows that the law is working," said former Rep. Elizabeth Holtzman, a member of the IWG. "Now, we need to work closely with the Agency to follow through with the release of these records."
*Copyright 2000 by United Press International. All rights reserved.*
*From: http://www.vny.com/cf/News/upidetail.cfm?QID=119975*
> In accordance with Title 17, Section 107 of the USC, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes.
>
As soon as World War II ended in Europe in June 1945, a defeated Germany was divided into four zones, controlled by the three major victors—the Americans, Soviets, and British—and the French. About 1.5 million German veterans were returning to their country from places like France, Italy, and Poland. Across the continent, there were still 2.5 million prisoners: soldiers, officers, politicians, and Nazi collaborators, among whom were those responsible for a conflict that caused at least 40 million deaths and the extermination of about 6 million Jews, 2 million Slavs, and another 200,000 civilians (such as Roma and Jehovah's Witnesses).
When the gunfire ceased, one objective dominated the victors: punishing the losers. "The punishment of war criminals is not a matter of revenge," stated British historian Eric Hobsbawm in his book *The Age of Extremes*. "It is about bringing back order and normalcy, restoring the peoples' trust in legally constituted bodies." According to Hobsbawm, this process of "denazification of Europe" did not intend to condemn thousands, but rather to "punish those who would serve as an example."
It was soon realized that separating those who were guilty from those who were deeply guilty would be a massive challenge. About 40,000 American, French, and British civil servants were called upon: an army of clerks, lawyers, and judges. In the American zone alone, 545 civil courts were established to review 900,000 cases.
Less than six months after the fall of Hitler, the victors were already prepared to indict and judge the most prominent culprits. Between November 20, 1945, and October 1 of the following year, the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg decreed 11 death sentences, three life sentences, two 20-year prison sentences, one 15-year sentence, and one 10-year sentence. Three defendants were acquitted. And that was it. In the two years following the trial, 1 million Germans left the country legally. It is estimated that another 100,000 did so illegally. Among them were criminals, executioners, and murderers. Many remained unpunished forever. Who? How? You will see next.
It was already the night of June 26, 1945, when a U.S. Army patrol spotted a man walking on a dirt road between Stuttgart and Ulm in southern Germany. Detained and interrogated, he claimed to be Adolf Barth, a corporal in the German Air Force. He was arrested. Over the following months, he was transferred between camps six times, and in each one, he introduced himself by a different name. In early 1946, he managed to escape, crossed the country, and settled in the rural area of Eversen, where he lived in isolation. His real name was Adolf Eichmann. A former colonel in the elite SS troop and head of the Gestapo (Hitler's secret police), he was one of the masterminds behind the "Final Solution," the operation intended to exterminate the Jews of Europe.
In 1950, when things cooled down, Eichmann decided to leave Germany and went to Italy. There, on June 14, the Argentine consulate in Genoa granted him an immigration visa on a passport under the name Ricardo Klement. He bought a ticket on the ship Giovanna C and, a month later, disembarked in Buenos Aires. He found a job and brought his family there. Later abducted by Israeli spies, he was taken to Tel Aviv, where he was convicted and executed in 1962.
Common sense suggests that, before the end of the war, Nazi leaders already had secret plans to save their own skins. One of these escape routes would become famous through the book *The Odessa File* by British author Frederick Forsyth. Despite being a fiction novel, it was based on a real organization called Odessa (a German acronym for "Organization of Former SS Members"). However, recent research shows that this type of initiative was responsible for few escapes. "National governments and completely legal institutions saved the faces of far more Nazis than secret organizations," says Jorge Camarasa, an Argentine historian and author of *Odessa al Sur* ("Odessa to the South," unpublished in Brazil).
The route Eichmann used to leave Europe, for example, was coordinated by Austrian Bishop Alois Hudal, rector of a seminary for German and Austrian priests in Rome. An avowed Nazi, he was appointed by the Vatican to visit war prisoners detained in Italy. According to Camarasa, Hudal used his position to facilitate the escape of wanted Nazi criminals. Initially, the bishop obtained false documents so that the prisoners could be released and then helped them hide, usually in the Italian countryside. When authorities began to suspect the scheme, Hudal realized he needed to get his protégés out of Europe. He turned to false identifications issued by the Vatican Refugee Committee. "These papers did not serve as passports, but it was with them that fugitives acquired a new identity and, thus, obtained assistance from the Red Cross, which, in turn, was used to get visas," states Australian journalist Mark Aarons, co-author of *Unholy Trinity* (without a Portuguese version). "In theory, the Red Cross was supposed to check the records of those applying for exit visas, but in practice, the word of a priest or, especially, a bishop was sufficient."
The largest Nazi escape route, however, was created by a network of priests led by Croatian Bishop Krunoslav Draganovic. "The organization established its headquarters at the San Girolamo Seminary in Rome. Initially, its focus was to get members of the Croatian Nazi party out of Soviet-occupied territories," states Uki Goñi, an Argentine historian and author of *The Real Odessa*. "Over time, Draganovic's route became the main escape pipeline for Nazi criminals, smuggling more than 5,000 of them out of Europe."
### LATIN AMERICA
Amidst the snow-capped peaks of Bariloche in the Argentine Andes, a German immigrant led a peaceful life for nearly 50 years. Owner of a pastry shop called Viena, Don Erico lived with his wife, Alice, on the second and top floor of a building in Belgrano Square, renting out the first floor to an orphanage. Two blocks away, a certain Juan Maler built the Campana Hotel, where he lived, writing books preaching Nazi ideology. In 1994, the American TV network ABC discovered that Maler was Reinhard Kops, a former SS captain. Unmasked in front of the cameras, Kops snitched: "Why are you running after me when the worst of the Nazis in Argentina lives right next door?" Don Erico, the friendly pastry chef, was Erich Priebke, a former Gestapo captain and co-perpetrator of a massacre of 330 Italian civilians in Rome in 1944.
Accusing his neighbor worked out for Kops, who hid in Chile. He was never tried and, two years later, returned to Bariloche, where he published Hitlerite texts until his death in 2001. As for Priebke, after a 17-month legal battle, he was extradited to Italy. There, he was convicted of multiple homicide but escaped a life sentence—the statute of limitations on his crime had expired in 1974, 30 years after it was committed. He was released, but the Italian courts overturned the judgment. Today, Priebke is under house arrest in Rome. There is no date set for a new trial. At 94 years old, he is the oldest prisoner in Europe.
For Argentine historian Uki Goñi, economic interests and pressure from the Catholic Church and immigrant communities may explain why Latin America became the preferred destination for Nazis. "My country has a peculiarity for having made a targeted effort—initiated or led—by President Juan Perón to bring over these war criminals," states Goñi. Perón's reasons, according to him, included gratitude (the Nazis helped him between 1943 and 1945) and sympathy for fascist ideals.
The first step in smuggling Nazis from Europe to Argentina, according to Goñi, was taken in January 1946 when Antonio Caggiano, Bishop of Rosario, went to Rome to be ordained as a cardinal. There, according to Argentine diplomatic archives, he conveyed a message to French Cardinal Eugène Tisserant that "the government of the Argentine Republic is willing to receive French citizens whose political attitude during the recent war may have exposed them to cruel measures and retaliation." In the following months, between 300 and 500 French collaborators went to Argentina with passports provided by the Red Cross in Rome.
Another factor that swelled the number of Nazis in Latin America was the use of war criminals as informants and spies in the Cold War (by the British and Americans on one side and the Soviets on the other). Many of them were saved from prison and routed to the Southern Cone. This was the case for Klaus Barbie, the former Gestapo director who ordered the execution of civilians and the dispatch of children to Auschwitz in France. In 1947, he became an agent for the U.S. Secret Service and later ended up fleeing to Bolivia. Discovered in 1971, he was not deported until 1983. Four years later, he was convicted in France for the deaths of 177 people. He died of leukemia in 1991 in a Lyon prison.
### SAFE HAVEN
In Brazil, the presence of Nazi criminals was also significant. The most famous case was that of physician Josef Mengele, who used humans as guinea pigs for his macabre experiments in Auschwitz (he died unpunished, drowning after a drinking bout in Bertioga, on the São Paulo coast, in 1979). The involvement of Brazilian authorities in the entry of war criminals is a controversial subject. But there is a flood of evidence indicating that the Nazis counted on goodwill to enter the country. In the more than 20,000 documents from the archives of the old Department of Political and Social Order (Deops) released by the federal government in 1997, there are letters exchanged between Brazilian representations in Rome and Berlin showing how our diplomacy turned a blind eye to the Nazi past of businessmen, engineers, and former military personnel—who were encouraged to declare false names and professions when coming here.
Experts raise the hypothesis that President Eurico Gaspar Dutra himself, who took office in 1946, knew what was happening. For Marionilde Brephol Magalhães, a historian at the Federal University of Paraná and author of *Pangermanismo e Nazismo – A Trajetória Alemã Rumo ao Brasil* ("Pan-Germanism and Nazism – The German Trajectory Toward Brazil"), in addition to the sympathy that sectors of the government and the military had for the Nazis, Dutra believed that German technicians and scientists could help with the country's industrialization.
An even bigger problem than the lack of border controls upon entry was the lack of willingness to arrest and extradit the criminals discovered here. The tolerance of the Brazilian government soon became well known and intensified the arrival of Nazis. Some did not even bother to change their names, such as Franz Stangl. Commander of the Sobibor and Treblinka extermination camps in Poland, he was even arrested in Austria in 1945 but managed to escape to Syria, where he reunited with his wife and children. According to Deops records, he landed in Brazil in 1951 and, some time later, secured a job at a Volkswagen factory in São Paulo.
Stangl was only arrested in 1967, following a tip-off from "Nazi hunter" Simon Wiesenthal (see box on page 28). Taken to what was then West Germany, he was tried for the deaths of 900,000 people—a fact he admitted to Hungarian-born journalist Gitta Sereny in a statement published in the book *Into That Darkness* (unpublished in Brazil). "My conscience is clear. I was only doing my duty," he said. Condemned to prison—
ABNT (NBR 6023)**, **APA (7ª edição)** e **Chicago (Notas e Bibliografia, 17ª edição)**.
## 1. Visão Geral e Recrutamento Global (EUA, Europa e Operação Paperclip)
### Livros Clássicos e Contemporâneos
#### Padrão ABNT
JACOBSEN, Annie. **Operação Paperclip**: o programa científico secreto que levou cientistas nazistas para os EUA. Tradução de Marcelo Brandão Cipolla. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2015.
SIMPSON, Christopher. **Blowback**: America's recruitment of Nazis and its effects on the Cold War. New York: Open Road Media, 2014.
LOWER, Wendy. **As mulheres do nazismo**: cúmplices, algozes e defensoras do Terceiro Reich. Tradução de Maria Beatriz de Medina. Rio de Janeiro: Rocco, 2014.
#### Padrão APA
Jacobsen, A. (2015). *Operação Paperclip: o programa científico secreto que levou cientistas nazistas para os EUA* (M. B. Cipolla, Trad.). Companhia das Letras.
Simpson, C. (2014). *Blowback: America's recruitment of Nazis and its effects on the Cold War*. Open Road Media.
Lower, W. (2014). *As mulheres do nazismo: cúmplices, algozes e defensoras do Terceiro Reich* (M. B. Medina, Trad.). Rocco.
#### Padrão Chicago
Jacobsen, Annie. *Operação Paperclip: o programa científico secreto que levou cientistas nazistas para os EUA*. Traduzido por Marcelo Brandão Cipolla. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2015.
Simpson, Christopher. *Blowback: America's recruitment of Nazis and its effects on the Cold War*. New York: Open Road Media, 2014.
Lower, Wendy. *As mulheres do nazismo: cúmplices, algozes e defensoras do Terceiro Reich*. Traduzido por Maria Beatriz de Medina. Rio de Janeiro: Rocco, 2014.
### Estudos Acadêmicos e Relatórios Governamentais
#### Padrão ABNT
BREITMAN, Richard *et al*. **U.S. intelligence and the Nazis**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
SCHIDLO, Shimon. **The Gehlen Organization and the US Army**: tactical intelligence in early Cold War Europe. *Journal of Intelligence History*, v. 14, n. 2, p. 112-129, 2015.
#### Padrão APA
Breitman, R., Goda, N. J. W., Naftali, T., & Wolfe, R. (2005). *U.S. intelligence and the Nazis*. Cambridge University Press.
Schidlo, S. (2015). The Gehlen Organization and the US Army: tactical intelligence in early Cold War Europe. *Journal of Intelligence History*, *14*(2), 112–129.
#### Padrão Chicago
Breitman, Richard, Norman J. W. Goda, Timothy Naftali, e Robert Wolfe. *U.S. intelligence and the Nazis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Schidlo, Shimon. "The Gehlen Organization and the US Army: tactical intelligence in early Cold War Europe." *Journal of Intelligence History* 14, nº 2 (2015): 112-129.
## 2. O Recrutamento do Lado Soviético (URSS e Operação Osoaviakhim)
### Livros e Estudos Contemporâneos
#### Padrão ABNT
MICK, Christoph. **Forschen für Stalin**: deutsche Fachleute in der sowjetischen Rüstungsindustrie 1945–1958. Berlim: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2000.
ALBRECHT, Ulrich *et al*. **Die Spezialisten**: deutsche Wissenschaftler und Techniker in der Sowjetunion nach 1945. Dietz: Berlim, 1992.
#### Padrão APA
Mick, C. (2000). *Forschen für Stalin: deutsche Fachleute in der sowjetischen Rüstungsindustrie 1945–1958*. De Gruyter Oldenbourg.
Albrecht, U., Heinemann-Grüder, A., & Wellmann, A. (1992). *Die Spezialisten: deutsche Wissenschaftler und Techniker in der Sowjetunion nach 1945*. Dietz.
#### Padrão Chicago
Mick, Christoph. *Forschen für Stalin: deutsche Fachleute in der sowjetischen Rüstungsindustrie 1945–1958*. Berlim: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2000.
Albrecht, Ulrich, Andreas Heinemann-Grüder, e Arend Wellmann. *Die Spezialisten: deutsche Wissenschaftler und Techniker in der Sowjetunion nach 1945*. Dietz: Berlim, 1992.
## 3. As Rotas de Fuga e Recrutamento na América do Sul
### Livros Antigos, Investigativos e Contemporâneos
#### Padrão ABNT
GOÑI, Uki. **A verdadeira Odessa**: como Perón trouxe os criminosos nazistas para a Argentina. Tradução de Celso Nogueira. Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2004.
CAMARASA, Jorge. **Odessa al Sur**: os laços secretos entre o nazismo e a Argentina. Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1995.
WIESENTHAL, Simon. **Justiça, não vingança**: memórias. Tradução de Jaime A. Clasen. Rio de Janeiro: Record, 1990.
MAGALHÃES, Marionilde Brepohl de. **Pangermanismo e nazismo**: a trajetória alemã rumo ao Brasil. Campinas: Editora da Unicamp, 1998.
SERENY, Gitta. **No Labirinto da Escuridão**: do eugenismo nazista ao assassinato em massa. Tradução de Vera Ribeiro. Rio de Janeiro: Editora 34, 1995.
#### Padrão APA
Goñi, U. (2004). *A verdadeira Odessa: como Perón trouxe os criminosos nazistas para a Argentina* (C. Nogueira, Trad.). Record.
Camarasa, J. (1995). *Odessa al Sur: os laços secretos entre o nazismo e a Argentina*. Planeta.
Wiesenthal, S. (1990). *Justiça, não vingança: memórias* (J. A. Clasen, Trad.). Record.
Magalhães, M. B. de. (1998). *Pangermanismo e nazismo: a trajetória alemã rumo ao Brasil*. Editora da Unicamp.
Sereny, G. (1995). *No Labirinto da Escuridão: do eugenismo nazista ao assassinato em massa* (V. Ribeiro, Trad.). Editora 34.
#### Padrão Chicago
Goñi, Uki. *A verdadeira Odessa: como Perón trouxe os criminosos nazistas para a Argentina*. Traduzido por Celso Nogueira. Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2004.
Camarasa, Jorge. *Odessa al Sur: os laços secretos entre o nazismo e a Argentina*. Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1995.
Wiesenthal, Simon. *Justiça, não vingança: memórias*. Traduzido por Jaime A. Clasen. Rio de Janeiro: Record, 1990.
Magalhães, Marionilde Brepohl de. *Pangermanismo e nazismo: a trajetória alemã rumo ao Brasil*. Campinas: Editora da Unicamp, 1998.
Sereny, Gitta. *No Labirinto da Escuridão: do eugenismo nazista ao assassinato em massa*. Traduzido por Vera Ribeiro. Rio de Janeiro: Editora 34, 1995.
## 4. O Recrutamento no Oriente Médio e África do Sul
### Estudos e Livros sobre Espionagem e Ciência Militar
#### Padrão ABNT
LOFTUS, John; AARONS, Mark. **The secret war against the Jews**: how western espionage betrayed the Jewish people. New
References (APA 7th Edition)
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Additional Sources on Operation Paperclip and Gehlen
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Suggested APA Citation for the Article
Garcia, R. V. (2026). Operation Silence: The hidden history of Operation Paperclip, the Gehlen Organization, and declassified Cold War files. Revista & Escolas de Mistérios.
